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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Fredrick D. Roy appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, Roy challenges the
partial denial of his motion to suppress and the denial of his motion in limine.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Trooper Brady Walker conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle because the
“right rear taillight lens was broken” and “there was a white light shining out to the
side and to the rear of the vehicle.”

(P.H. Tr., p.26, Ls.4-20.)

Roy was a

passenger in that car. (P.H. Tr., p.27, Ls.2-17.) During the course of the traffic
stop, Trooper Walker learned that the driver’s driving privileges were suspended,
and he noticed “a green leafy marijuana bud on the floor of the rear seat.” (P.H.
Tr., p.28, Ls.1-7.) As a result, Trooper Walker “directed the occupants to exit the
vehicle so [he] could retrieve the bud and confirm [his] suspicion that it was
marijuana.” (P.H. Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3.) Both Roy and the driver moved behind the
vehicle and stood near the front of Trooper Walker’s front push bumper while a
cover officer, Deputy Lucas Martin, stood nearby. (P.H. Tr., p.8, Ls.8-25, p.29,
Ls.5-11.)
While waiting outside the vehicle, Deputy Martin had to remind both Roy
and the driver “numerous times to keep their hands out of their pockets.” (P.H.
Tr., p.16, Ls.3-4.)

Because Roy “refused to do what Trooper Walker was

saying,” Roy was ultimately placed in handcuffs. (P.H. Tr., p.16, L.22 – p.17,
L.2.) In the process of handcuffing Roy, Trooper Walker pulled Roy’s hand out
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of his pocket and “inside of [Roy’s] hand,” was a metal tin. (P.H. Tr., p.18, Ls.25, p.41, L.22 – p.43, L.8.) Deputy Martin opened the tin and found three .22
rounds inside.

(P.H. Tr., p.18, Ls.6-23.)

The tin and its contents were

subsequently returned to Roy and he was released from the scene. (P.H. Tr.,
p.19, Ls.2-14.) The driver was, however, arrested and his vehicle was searched.
(P.H. Tr., p.29, Ls.12-13, p.40, L.12 – p.41, L.11.) The search of the vehicle
revealed “several marijuana buds on the floor,” “several burnt marijuana
cigarettes,” and a “Winchester Model 39 .22 firearm under the front passenger
seat” where Roy had been sitting. (P.H. Tr., p.29, Ls.14-20, p.48, Ls.14-24; see
Exhibit 1.) The firearm was not discovered until after Roy was released. (P.H.
Tr., p.31, Ls.17-19.)
After Roy left, Deputy Martin also “noticed something underneath the front
end of Trooper Walker’s vehicle,” which he had not noticed previously. (P.H. Tr.,
p.11, Ls.12-25.) That item “was a bolt that matched the firearm” and it was
found “resting on the asphalt just below the push bumper of” Trooper Walker’s
patrol car. (P.H. Tr., p.31, Ls.17-24.) Trooper Walker also had not seen the bolt
when he first initiated the traffic stop, or prior to Roy leaving the scene. (P.H. Tr.,
p.32, Ls.2-7.) Because further investigation revealed that Roy was a convicted
felon, Roy was later arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm. (P.H. Tr.,
p.33, L.22 – p.36, L.18.)
The state charged Roy with unlawful possession of a firearm. (R., pp.1516, 57, 114, 134-135, 139-140, 171-172.)

The state also alleged Roy is a

persistent violator. (R., pp.134-135, 139-140, 171-172.) Roy filed a motion to
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suppress, asserting his seizure and the search of his person violated the Idaho
Constitution, and the “4th and 5th Amendments” to the United States Constitution.
(R., pp.72-79.) The district court granted Roy’s motion with respect to the search
of the tin found in Roy’s pocket, but denied the motion with respect to Roy’s
claim that he was unlawfully seized. (R., pp.105-112.)
Prior to trial, Roy also filed a motion in limine asking the court to exclude
anticipated testimony from Donna Williams that, two months prior to Roy’s arrest
in this case, she saw him with a “pistol” that looked similar to the gun that formed
the basis of the unlawful possession of a firearm charge. (R., pp.164-168.) The
district court denied Roy’s motion in limine, after which Roy entered a conditional
guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the partial denial of his motion to
suppress and motion in limine, and the state dismissed the sentencing
1
enhancement. (R., pp.173, 176-177, 182-192; see generally Tr. ) The court

imposed a fixed two-year sentence, but stayed the sentence pending appeal.
(R., pp.195-197.) Roy filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. (R.,
pp.199-201.)

1

“Tr.” refers to the transcript that includes the hearings held on June 23, 2016,
July 21, 2016, and July 25, 2016.
3

ISSUES
Roy states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Roy’s
motion in limine?
2. Did the district court err in partially denying Mr. Roy’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Although “[m]indful” of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Patterson,
140 Idaho 612, 97 P.3d 479 (Ct. App. 2004), Roy nevertheless asserts the
district court erred in rejecting his claim that he was entitled to suppression
based on an allegedly unlawful seizure. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.) Because
Roy has failed to identify any error in the district court’s reliance on binding
precedent, has he failed to show the district court erred in partially denying his
motion to suppress?
2.
Has Roy failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to exclude proposed testimony that Roy previously possessed a gun
that looked like the gun that formed the basis of the unlawful possession of a
firearm charge?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Roy Has Failed To Show Error In The Partial Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Roy challenges the partial denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically,

Roy argues that, although he is “[m]indful of State v. Patterson, 140 Idaho 612
(Ct. App. 2004),” the district court nevertheless “erred in its ruling.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p.8.) As Roy effectively concedes, the law does not support his claim of
error.

The district court’s order partially denying Roy’s motion to suppress

should, therefore, be affirmed.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found.” State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Roy Was Lawfully Seized
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants

and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” State v. Patterson, 140 Idaho 612, 614, 97 P.3d 479,
481 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). No Fourth Amendment violation occurs if
an officer has “reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws.” Id.
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“Idaho Code Section 49-902 requires that tail lamps be ‘in proper
condition’ at all times.” Patterson, 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481. “Proper
condition” includes the requirement “that every motor vehicle shall be equipped
with tail lamps mounted on the rear, ‘which when lighted as required, shall emit a
red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear.’” Id.
(quoting I.C. § 49-906). Section 49-910(3), I.C., in turn, provides:
All lighting devices and reflectors mounted on the rear of any
vehicle shall display or reflect a red color, except the stoplight or
other signal device, which may be red, amber, or yellow, and
except that the light illuminating the license plate shall be white and
the light emitted by a back-up lamp may be white, amber, or red.
Trooper Walker testified that the traffic stop of the car in which Roy was a
passenger was based on a broken “right rear taillight lens” with “a white light
shining out to the side and to the rear of the vehicle.” (P.H. Tr., p.26, Ls.4-20.)
Based on this testimony, the district court found that the traffic stop was lawful
because Trooper Walker had reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle
was being driven contrary to the statutes governing the requirements for tail
lights. (R., pp.108-109.) In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on
Patterson, 140 Idaho at 615, 97 P.3d at 615, in which the Court of Appeals held
that “driving with taillights that emit light of a color other than red,” is a violation of
I.C. §§ 49-902, 49-906, and 49-910. (R., pp.108-109.)
On appeal, Roy asserts he is “[m]indful” of Patterson, but nevertheless
contends “the district court erred in its ruling” and asks this Court to “conclude
that the fact that a taillight appears to be broken and not perfectly repaired
should not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to support a
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stop and a consequent investigatory detention.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.) Roy,
however, offers no justification for this Court to ignore controlling precedent. See
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted)
(the Court “will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is shown
to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time
to be unwise or unjust”); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660,
680 (1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are
manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”). As such,
Roy has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s partial denial of his
suppression motion.
II.
Roy Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s In Limine Ruling That
Proposed Testimony Linking Roy To The Gun That Formed The Basis Of The
Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm Charge Was Relevant And Not Unfairly
Prejudicial
A.

Introduction
Roy asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ruled, in limine,

that Williams could testify that, two months prior to Roy’s arrest, she saw him
possess a firearm similar to the one that served as the basis of the unlawful
possession of a firearm charge. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7.) In particular, Roy
argues that “Ms. Williams’ testimony was not relevant to whether [he] committed
the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm on December 25, 2015,” and,
even if relevant, such testimony would be “unduly prejudicial.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.6.)

Roy’s claims fail.

Review of the applicable law, and the proffered

evidence, reveals that the court’s pretrial ruling that Williams’ proposed testimony
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would be admissible at trial was consistent with the standards governing
relevance under I.R.E. 401, and prejudice under I.R.E. 403.
B.

Standard Of Review
“When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an

abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 450, 375 P.3d
279, 280 (2016) (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160,
163–64, 45 P.3d 816, 819–20 (2002)). “‘To determine whether a trial court has
abused its discretion, this Court considers whether it correctly perceived the
issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.’” Jones, 160 Idaho at 450, 375 P.3d at 280 (quoting
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821
(2000)).
C.

Roy Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Ruling, In Limine, That Williams’ Proposed Testimony Regarding Roy’s
Prior Possession Of A Similar Firearm Was Admissible
Prior to trial, Roy filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude proposed

testimony from Donna Williams that, two months prior to Roy’s arrest, Roy asked
her to “hold a pistol” for him. (R., pp.164-168.) Roy’s motion was based on a
written statement Williams provided to law enforcement, which reads:
About 2 months ago, Fred Roy, asked me to hold a pistol for a 5.00
loan. I agreed, later that same evening he wanted it back so I
returned it. The pistol was about 12-13” and a 22 caliber. It looked
like a kit to me and unsafe. The stock was wood & normal bluing
but to me the gun looked unsafe and I was glad he picked it up, just
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wasn’t comfortable with it being in my house. It looked as if there
was a piece of metal missing up by the bolt assembly.
(R., p.168 (verbatim).)
In his motion in limine, Roy argued that the proposed testimony, as
summarized in Williams’ written statement, was “too remote in time to be
relevant,” and was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (R., pp.164-165.) Roy also
argued Williams’ anticipated testimony was not relevant because Williams’
written description did not match the “firearm seized by police,” which he
described as “a rifle, significantly longer than 12-13 inches in length,” and
“stainless in color not blued.” (R., p.165.) At the hearing on Roy’s motion, the
state elaborated on the anticipated testimony from Williams:
The State would offer that the testimony of Ms. Williams is -- shows
that the rifle that she has previously identified to law enforcement,
had seen -- that she had seen that a couple of months prior to that
weapon turning up in the vehicle that Mr. Roy was a passenger in
is substantially the same as the weapon that was in the vehicle.
Ms. Williams is expected to testify that, yes, it was dark in her
trailer when Mr. Roy brought the weapon in. She identified it as
about 12 to 13 inches in length when, in fact, it’s about a foot-anda-half. It’s a -- it’s a sawed off -- it’s a rifle barrel, but it’s on a pistol
-- a homemade pistol gripped stock. Therefore, that is substantially
similar to the weapon that was discovered.
As well, Ms. Williams is expected to testify as to what she
meant by bluing. That bluing is not something that has a -- any
particular color, but that a blued weapon can have any -- any
number of shades. And in her impression, a blued barrel meant
that it was not glossy. And so that is what she is expected to testify
to. She will have an opportunity to see the weapon, and it’s
expected that she will identify [it] as the weapon that she did
see a couple of months prior.
(Tr., p.9, L.16 – p.10, L.14) (emphasis added).
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Before ruling on Roy’s motion in limine, the district court asked whether
“the issue in this case is going to be ownership or possession of the firearm in
question,” to which defense counsel answered, “Correct.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.14-18.)
The court denied Roy’s motion in limine, finding Williams’ anticipated testimony
to be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. (Tr., p.17, L.18 – p.18, L.14.) The
court also rejected Roy’s claim that the evidence was improper under I.R.E.
404(b). (Tr., p.18, L.20 – p.19, L.14.)
The district court correctly concluded that Williams’ expected testimony
would be admissible at trial.
I.R.E. 401, 402.

To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.

Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of

consequence in the case, and has any tendency to make the existence of that
fact more probable than it would be without the evidence is relevant. State v.
Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). Pursuant to
I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court’s discretion,
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v.
Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols,
124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). “The rule suggests a
strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.” State v. Martin, 118
Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original). Rule
403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in the
sense of being detrimental to a party’s case. See State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho
285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (”Certainly that evidence was prejudicial to
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the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is demonstrably
admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in prejudice to a
defendant.”).

Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that is unfairly

prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an improper
basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. As long as the evidence is
relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant’s character and its
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the
probability of unfair prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho
667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999).
In order to prove Roy was guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, I.C. §
18-3316, the state was required to present evidence that, on or about December
25, 2015, in the state of Idaho, Roy knowingly owned, purchased, possessed, or
had under his custody or control, a firearm, and, “when doing so,” Roy
“previously had been convicted of a felony.” (R., p.171; ICJI 1401.) Williams’
anticipated testimony that, two months prior to Roy’s arrest in this case, Roy
possessed a firearm that was “substantially the same as the weapon that was”
the subject of the unlawful possession charge, and her “expected” identification
of the firearm “as the weapon that she did see a couple of months prior” (Tr., p.9,
L.13 – p.10, L.14) is, as the district court found, “obvious[ly]” relevant (Tr., p.17,
Ls.19-21). Testimony that Roy previously possessed the firearm unquestionably
tends to prove that the firearm was in his possession on December 25, 2015. As
defense counsel acknowledged, “ownership or possession of the firearm in
question” would have been “the issue” had the case proceeded to trial. (Tr.,
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p.12, Ls.14-18.)

Further, the highly probative value of Williams’ expected

testimony outweighed any potential prejudice.
Roy, however, argues that Williams’ testimony was not relevant because
Williams did not “positively identif[y] the weapon found in the vehicle in which Mr.
Roy was traveling in December as the same” weapon she saw two months prior.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)

This argument fails because it ignores the state’s

representation, on which the court’s ruling was based, that Williams was
expected to identify the firearm “as the weapon that she did see a couple of
months prior.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.12-14.) Roy’s assertion that Williams’ expected
testimony was not relevant is without merit.
Roy’s prejudice argument also lacks merit. Roy claims that “the limited
probative value of Ms. Williams’ testimony was substantially outweighed by the
danger a jury would find [him] guilty of the crime here because he, a felon, was
previously in possession of a firearm.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) As previously
noted, the probative value of Williams’ testimony was high.

As for Roy’s

prejudice argument, Roy ignores the fact that Williams’ expected testimony was
not that Roy possessed “a firearm,” it was that she saw him with “the” firearm
that formed the basis of the unlawful possession charge. This fact was central to
the district court’s analysis:
Again, the unique nature of the firearm and the State’s
witness alleging it is the same firearm is what the Court ruled is
crucial in this matter. As I made clear to counsel off the record,
had it been just evidence of a firearm, I certainly wouldn’t have
allowed it. But as [the prosecutor] explained in a prior argument
with the Court, it was alleged to be a very distinctive type firearm in
this case.
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(Tr., p.19, Ls.7-14.)
Application of the correct legal standards to the proffered testimony
outlined in the record shows Roy has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
error in the district court’s relevance determination, and has failed to meet his
burden of showing the district court abused its discretion in its weighing analysis
under I.R.E. 403.
Roy has failed to show any error in either the partial denial of his motion to
suppress or in the denial of his motion in limine.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
partial denial of Roy’s motion to suppress, and the denial of his motion in limine.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2017.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of March, 2017, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ANDREA REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_____
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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